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Purpose as a Guide to the 
Interpretation of the Confrontation 
Clause 
Roger C. Park† 
I agree with most of the points raised by Professor 
Friedman’s contribution to this symposium.1  I applaud the 
change from Ohio v. Roberts to Crawford v. Washington, and I 
was one of the law professors who signed the Friedman amicus 
brief in Crawford.2  But I differ from him about the approach 
that should be used in interpreting Crawford. 
Professor Friedman does not seem to be completely 
comfortable with giving a purposive interpretation to the 
Confrontation Clause or with exploring the reasons for 
providing confrontation.  In the paper presented here, he states 
that “[t]he purpose of the Confrontation Clause is to assure 
that prosecution testimony be given under prescribed 
conditions, most notably that it be in the presence of the 
accused and subject to cross-examination.”3  This statement 
  
 † James Edgar Hervey Professor of Law, UC Hastings College of Law. 
 1 Richard D. Friedman, Grappling with the Meaning of “Testimonial”, 71 
BROOK. L. REV. 241 (2005). 
 2 Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980); Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 
(2004). 
 3 Friedman, supra note 2, at 245. Compare id. with Richard D. Friedman, 
Children as Victims and Witnesses in the Criminal Trial Process: The Conundrum of 
Children, Confrontation, and Hearsay, 65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 243, 247 (2002).  
Professor Friedman’s pre-Crawford article criticized the “reliability” approach of Ohio 
v. Roberts: 
The Confrontation Clause is not a constitutionalization of the law of hearsay, 
with all its oddities. It does not speak of reliability or of exceptions. The 
confrontation right reflects a belief, central to our system of criminal justice, 
that a witness against a criminal defendant should give testimony under 
prescribed conditions – under oath, in the presence of the accused, subject to 
cross-examination, and, if reasonably possible, in open court. And this right 
should be recognized – as the language of the Confrontation Clause suggests 
– as categorical and not subject to exceptions. 
Id.  Roberts adopted a purposive approach to Confrontation doctrine.  Ohio v. Roberts, 
448 U.S. 56, 65 (1980).  As interpreted, the Roberts approach did not provide much 
protection or guidance.  One possible reaction to the shortcomings of Roberts is to 
abandon the attempt to articulate an overall purpose.  In my view, Roberts was a 
 
298 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:1 
describes procedural elements of confrontation, but it does not 
tell us why they are desirable.  I think we should go a step 
further and ask “Why provide a procedure with cross-
examination in the presence of the accused?”  Where the text of 
the Confrontation Clause does not clearly resolve an issue, we 
should be guided by a concept of purpose.4 
The primary purpose of the Confrontation Clause is to 
prevent injustice caused by abuse of state power.5  Absence of 
confrontation facilitates the abuse of state power in at least 
three ways: 
1. Secrecy – Preventing the defendant from learning facts 
about the declarant, hearing the declarant’s whole story, 
or learning about the circumstances under which the story 
was given. 
2. Falsehoods – Presenting a false account of the declarant’s 
story or the conditions under which it was produced. 
3. Undue influence – Pressuring the declarant with torture, 
abuse or intimidation, or taking advantage of 
vulnerabilities of the declarant. 
To some extent, the mere appearance of the declarant 
provides a modicum of protection against these abuses.  The 
declarant who has been pressured by the prosecution may 
  
failure not because it adopted a purposive approach, but because its delineation of 
purpose focused on reliability instead of the danger of abuse of state power, and 
because its guidelines were not sufficiently categorical. 
 4 See Margaret A. Berger, The Deconstitutionalization of the Confrontation 
Clause: A Proposal for a Prosecutorial Restraint Model, 76 MINN. L. REV. 557, 560-01 
(1992).  Critiquing the cases interpreting Ohio v. Roberts, Professor Berger argued that 
the Court’s opinions overlooked the core concern of the Bill of Rights in preventing 
government oppression.  Id. at 557-61.  She did not claim that she could prove that the 
drafters of the Bill of Rights intended that specific interpretation, noting the 
sparseness of the historic record.  Id. at 562.  Moreover, she would not advocate a 
narrow intentionalist approach to constitutional interpretation even if the historical 
record were more clear.  Id.  Instead, she advocated attributing to the Confrontation 
Clause a general purpose of giving “the accused and the public [the ability] to monitor, 
curb, and expose prosecutorial abuse,” pointing out that this interpretation was 
historically plausible, consistent with a unitary view of the Bill of Rights, and 
compatible with the results of the Court’s precedent, if not always with the language of 
its opinions.  Id. at 562-63. 
 5 See id. at 560-61.  It may also be accurate to say that the purpose of the 
Clause is to protect truth-finding.  See Akhil Reed Amar, Sixth Amendment First 
Principles, 84 GEO. L.J. 641, 688 (1996).  But I believe that the purpose is to deal with a 
particular kind of threat to the truth.  The Clause was limited to criminal proceedings 
and framed with a view toward injustices such as those exhibited in the Raleigh trial.  
See Trial of Sir Walter Raleigh, 2 How. St. Tr. 1 (1603).  I think it is reasonable and 
wise to see abuse of state power as the core concern, one calling for a confrontation 
procedure not constitutionally required in other types of legal proceedings, and calling 
for truth-finding safeguards that might be unnecessary if we could trust police, judges, 
and prosecutors to resist political influence and popular outrage. 
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recant spontaneously.  In cases in which there is a danger of 
abuse of state power, even demeanor evidence may have some 
value.  Scholars have expressed well-founded skepticism about 
demeanor as a lie detector, that is, about the ability of triers of 
fact to detect lying through cues such as nervousness, eye 
aversion, and hesitation.  Lab experiments suggest that triers 
of fact are unlikely to be able to reach accurate results based on 
these cues.6  However, when one imagines accusations based 
upon intimidation, demeanor may be more useful. The fact that 
a witness might display psychological or physical signs of 
torture if the witness were presented in court might have some 
value in deterring this form of abuse, as would the fact that the 
witness might recant and make an accusation of intimidation if 
allowed to testify in open court.  The experimental evidence 
does not rebut this possibility, nor could it, within the bounds 
of ethical experimentation. 
However, cross-examination is probably more important 
than mere observation of the declarant.  Although it is not a 
cure-all, it can help prevent abuses by allowing adversarial 
testing and the elicitation of concessions, and by enhancing the 
display of demeanor. 
On cross-examination, sometimes a witness can be led 
into asserting facts that can be disproven,7 or into conceding 
  
 6 See Olin Guy Wellborn III, Demeanor, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1075, 1088 
(1991); see also PAUL EKMAN, TELLING LIES  213 (2d ed. 1992); ALDERT VRIJ, 
DETECTING LIES AND DECEIT (2000); R.C.L. Lindsay, Gary L. Wells & Fergus J. 
O’Connor, Mock-Juror Belief of Accurate and Inaccurate Eyewitnesses, 13 LAW & HUM. 
BEHAV. 333, 337 (1989); Roger C. Park, Empirical Evaluation of the Hearsay Rule, in 
ESSAYS FOR COLIN TAPPER 91, 92-99 (Peter Mirfield & Roger Smith eds., 2003); 
Michael J. Saks, What Do Jury Experiments Tell Us About How Juries (Should) Make 
Decisions?, 6 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 1, 20-23 (1997); James P. Timony, Demeanor 
Credibility, 49 CATH. U. L. REV. 903, 930 (2000). 
 7 The notorious Detective Fuhrman in the O.J. Simpson trial provides one 
example.  On cross-examination of the allegedly racist detective, defense counsel got 
Fuhrman to deny that he had used the word “nigger” in the past ten years.  
Christopher B. Mueller, Introduction: O.J. Simpson and the Criminal Justice System 
on Trial, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 727, 733 (1996).  When conclusive proof to the contrary 
emerged, the prosecution’s whole case was seriously damaged.  Id. at 733.  For other 
examples of this “commit and contradict” tactic, see FRANCIS L. WELLMAN, THE ART OF 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 85-89 (4th ed., Touchstone 1997) (1903) (on cross-examination, an 
expert witness claimed that an authoritative treatise supports his position, and is 
discredited when lawyer produces the treatise and expert cannot show where treatise 
supports him); id. at 136-38 (witness claimed crucial meeting made him late for school, 
and on cross confirmed and amplified story by saying he had been marked late at 
school; cross-examiner was allowed to point out that the all city schools were closed on 
December 28 and to ask witness for an explanation how he could have gone to school 
that day; witness had no answer); 5 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT 
COMMON LAW § 1368, at 39 (Chadbourn rev., Little Brown and Co. 1974) (witness 
testified on cross that he weighed arsenic by shot and found some missing, lawyers 
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facts because the witness fears that lies can be disproved.  
Testing can include asking the witness to describe facts that 
the witness could be expected to know if the witness’s other 
testimony were true, or to show knowledge and skill consistent 
with claimed expertise. For example, a witness who claims to 
have been in the house of the accused could be asked to 
describe its interior.8  A child who has been led into false 
testimony could be tested for suggestibility by a cross-
examination that amounts to a suggestive interview.9  The 
cross-examiner of an honest witness can often hope for 
concessions, as can the cross-examiner of a witness who is 
afraid to lie for fear of being contradicted.  The witness who is 
testifying under compulsion from the prosecution may be eager 
to offer concessions. 
In the O.J. Simpson trial, for example, Kato Kaelin, a 
houseguest at Simpson’s estate, was called as a witness for the 
prosecution.  Some of his testimony was favorable to the 
prosecution: he had seen Simpson before the murders, his 
contact with Simpson ended in plenty of time for Simpson to 
have committed the murders, and he had heard thumps on the 
wall of his living quarters at a time that would connect 
Simpson with the bloody glove found nearby.  Nonetheless, 
Kaelin was a disappointment to the prosecution.  Perhaps 
because he resented threats that he would be prosecuted if he 
did not cooperate in the investigation, Kaelin seemed to shade 
his testimony toward the defense on other points.  For instance, 
  
gathered samples of shot from local grocers, finding that different parcels of shot varied 
more in weight than the weight of the allegedly missing arsenic). 
 8 For examples of this type of cross-examination, see JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, 
THE SCIENCE OF JUDICIAL PROOF § 248 (3d ed. 1937) (Surratt’s trial; witness testified 
he saw the accused in a hotel in Elmira, but was unable to describe hotel or other 
features of Elmira); id. (Langton’s trial; servant who testified where employer was in 
crucial month was not able to say where he was in other months, explaining “the 
question that I came for, my lord, did not fall upon that time”); id. (Hillmon’s trial; 
witness was able to say that Hillmon was missing a tooth but not whether other 
acquaintances were missing teeth). 
 9 One leading authority, John E.B. Myers, suggests that the cross-examiner 
should test the child by, in effect, doing a suggestive interview.  John E.B. Myers, The 
Child Witness: Techniques for Direct Examination, Cross-Examination, and 
Impeachment, 18 PAC. L.J. 801, 887 (1987).  He recommends that the cross-examiner 
display a friendly, low-key demeanor, seeking to establish rapport with the child, while 
reinforcing answers favorable to the cross-examiner with nods or other signs of 
approval.  Id. at 878-79.  He gives an example from a transcript in which the lawyer 
induced the child to say that they had met before and that the lawyer was wearing a 
red suit with stripes around the legs, facts that were not true.  Id. at 887. 
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during cross-examination by the defense, he described Simpson 
as laid-back and relaxed shortly before the murders occurred.10 
Tests, however, can backfire, so they are not always the 
best tactic for cross-examination.  Ordinarily, in fact, lawyers 
are cautious about using them.  In a normal case, the cross-
examiner is best off following the prevailing take-no-chances 
approach, under which the lawyer puts a fact to the witness 
that the witness cannot deny and whose answer is known 
ahead of time.11  For example, rather than, “Describe what you 
saw inside the house,” the more typical cross-examination 
question would be something like, “It was dark, wasn’t it?”  A 
take-no-chances cross-examination can be persuasive, but it is 
not essential to the preservation of justice. 
In thinking about the Confrontation Clause, we need to 
think about the extraordinary case: the one in which there is a 
danger of abuse of state power, such that cross-examination 
serves as a safeguard against overreaching.  Cross-examination 
prevents overreaching when it adds something new, something 
that cannot otherwise be shown as evidence.  It is the resort of 
the defendant who is at such a disadvantage that he can take 
chances, as Sir Walter Raleigh did when he said that he would 
put his whole case on Lord Cobham’s testimony if they would 
but produce Cobham from “the house hard by.”12 
Even Justice Scalia’s opinion in Crawford shows signs of 
being open to a functional approach, so long as the assessment 
is filtered through the eyes of the Framers.  In responding to 
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s lament that the fact that a statement 
is testimonial does not make it any less reliable, he wrote: 
Involvement of government officers in the production of testimony 
with an eye toward trial presents unique potential for prosecutorial 
abuse – a fact borne out time and again throughout a history with 
which the Framers were keenly familiar.  This consideration does 
not evaporate when testimony happens to fall within some broad, 
modern hearsay exception, even if that exception might be justifiable 
in other circumstances.13 
  
 10 See JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE RUN OF HIS LIFE 123 (1996). 
 11 For expositions of the take-no-chances approach, see STEVEN LUBET, 
MODERN TRIAL ADVOCACY 105-21 (2d ed. 1997) and THOMAS A. MAUET, TRIAL 
TECHNIQUES 252 (5th ed. 2000). 
 12 Trial of Sir Walter Raleigh, 2 How. St. Tr. 1 (1603);  See JON R. WALTZ & 
ROGER C. PARK, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE 97-98 (10th ed. 2004) (quoting 
J.G. PHILLIMORE, HISTORY AND PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 157 (1850) 
(providing an account of the Raleigh trial). 
 13 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56 n.7. 
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There are dangers, though, in using a functional 
approach instead of an historical/conceptual one.  It is possible 
that judges will use a functional approach to water down the 
right to confrontation, whereas an unexplained 
historical/conceptual approach might hold its ground a while 
longer.  But, for those who are in favor of protecting the rights 
of the accused, it is awkward to switch back and forth between 
interpretive approaches depending upon the results that they 
reach.  I think it is better to argue forthrightly for safeguards 
and explain the reasons for them.  History can be an uncertain 
friend, and unless we really are convinced of the superiority of 
eighteenth century procedures and penalties, we should prefer 
to interpret constitutional text in light of general purposes. 
The task of interpreting the concept of “testimonial” 
evidence has fallen mostly on state court trial judges and the 
justices of state intermediate appellate courts.  These judges 
may have intellectual attainments that rival those of the 
Justices of the United States Supreme Court, but they lack the 
Supreme Court’s platoon of law clerks and its amicus briefs, 
not to mention its ability to control its docket.  If their 
interpretations of terms left undefined by the Supreme Court 
are to be guided by anything other than instinct and dictionary 
definitions, that guidance should come from analogies drawn 
against the background of a concept of purpose.  It is 
unrealistic to expect these judges and the lawyers who appear 
before them to research English procedural history or the 
intent of the Framers.  Doing that research would deprive 
judges of time needed for other tasks imposed upon them by 
higher courts, such as learning the scientific method in order to 
screen expert testimony. 
What difference would it make if judges focused on the 
danger of abuse of state power?  In child abuse cases, a concern 
about state misconduct might lead to concern about whether 
the child was subjected to suggestive interviewing, and not 
whether the child was old enough to understand that the 
interview might lead to prosecution.14  In both child and adult 
cases, judges might be more likely to allow casual hearsay that 
  
 14 Compare Berger, supra note 3, at 566 (“In these kinds of cases the 
Confrontation Clause should be interpreted to restrain prosecutors from using 
suggestive, manipulative questioning techniques.”), with Friedman, supra note 2, at 
249-51 (suggesting tentatively that a child’s response to suggestive questioning could 
be considered nontestimonial if the child was too young to realize that the statement 
might be used prosecutorially). 
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did not involve state agents to pass Confrontation Clause 
muster.  Moreover, substitutes for face-to-face confrontation 
could be assessed by whether they allowed testing, probing for 
concessions and a view of demeanor.  The fact that prior 
proceedings offered in evidence were videotaped would 
ordinarily be a factor in favor of saying that the constitutional 
right was satisfied, as opposed to being a factor that cut the 
other way because the taping made the prior proceeding more 
formal.  But particular results are not the focus of my 
comment.  The central point is that we should not give up on a 
functional approach to confrontation just because the Ohio v. 
Roberts approach did not work out. What is needed is an 
approach with more safeguards, not an approach that is shy 
about articulating rationales for providing confrontation. 
